25x-0.25=150
25x=149.75
x=5.99
5.99$ for each pair.
Answer:
itll be 10
Explanation:
because on how itll show for the energy on demand
Answer:
Increase in operating income by $12,000
Explanation:
The above is an incomplete question because the value for 'space normally used to produce the rented line' is missing. However, I assumed the value is $26,000 per year as gotten from the internet -Chegg.
Given the above information, the operating income can be affected as calculated below;
Sales revenue $85,000
Add additional revenue $26,000
Total revenue $11,1000
Less: variable expenses ($40,000)
Contribution margin $71,000
Less: fixed expense ($52,000)
New net operating income
$19,000
Less: Original operating income
($7,000)
Increase in operating income
$12,000
This is a key idea with international trade. This involves what is known as comparative advantage.
let's say country A can produce a ton of soybeans in 4 hours and a ton of corn in 2 hours. While country B can produce a ton of soybeans in 15 hours and a ton of corn in 5 hours.
Looking at this set up you can see that country A can produce both corn and soybeans faster, so they have an absolute advantage in both!
However what trade is based on is opportunity cost. So if we think about how much corn country A has to give up to produce soybeans, they have to divert a total of 4 hours from corn to soy beans to produce one ton of soy beans. That 4 hours could be used to produce 2 tons of corn (since 2 hours for 1 ton and we're taking away 4 hours!). So opportunity cost of soybeans in country A is 2 corn.
In country B they would need a total of 15 hours to produce one extra ton of soybeans, but those 15 hours could instead be used to produce 3 tons of corn (5 hours per ton and we're stealing 15 total hours). That means country B's opportunity cost is 3 corn.
Since A has a lower opportunity cost in produce soybeans they will specialize and B will specialize in corn.
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Explanation: The first, addressed in Part I, is the administrative cost of deregulation, which has grown substantially under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.Part II addresses the consequences of the FCC's use of a competitor-welfare standard when formulating its policies for local competition, rather than a consumer-welfare standard. I evaluate the reported features of the FCC's decision in its Triennial Review. Press releases and statements concerning that decision suggest that the FCC may have finally embraced a consumer-welfare approach to mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices. The haphazard administrative process surrounding the FCC's decision, however, increases the likelihood of reversal on appeal.Beginning in Part III, I address at greater length the WorldCom fraud and bankruptcy. I offer an early assessment of the harm to the telecommunications industry from WorldCom's fraud and bankruptcy. I explain how WorldCom's misconduct caused collateral damage to other telecommunications firms, government, workers, and the capital markets. WorldCom's false Internet traffic reports and accounting fraud encouraged overinvestment in long-distance capacity and Internet backbone capacity. Because Internet traffic data are proprietary and WorldCom dominated Internet backbone services, and because WorldCom was subject to regulatory oversight, it was reasonable for rival carriers to believe WorldCom's misrepresentation of Internet traffic growth. Event study analysis suggests that the harm to rival carriers and telecommunications equipment manufacturers from WorldCom's restatement of earnings was $7.8 billion. WorldCom's false or fraudulent statements also supplied state and federal governments with incorrect information essential to the formulation of telecommunication policy. State and federal governments, courts, and regulatory commissions would thus be justified in applying extreme skepticism to future representations made by WorldCom.Part IV explains how WorldCom's fraud and bankruptcy may have been intended to harm competition, and in the future may do so, by inducing exit (or forfeiture of market share) by the company's rivals. WorldCom repeatedly deceived investors, competitors, and regulators with false statements about its Internet traffic projections and financial performance. At a minimum, WorldCom's fraudulent or false
