Answer:
<em>I can see there are no choices.</em>
Purchase or Lease Stage
Explanation:
The "Hardware Lifecycle" has several stages or phases. These are:<em> Plan, Purchase or Lease, Deploy & Install, Maintenance, Upgrade, Parts & Repair, Extend, Buyback or Trade In and Dispose or Recyle.</em>
The situation above is part of the<em> "Purchase or Lease Stage."</em> This stage <u>allows the person to buy the computer that they wanted.</u> When it comes to the IT hardware, the person can either "Buy" or "Lease." One may choose the second option if he is not yet ready to buy.
So, this explains the answer.
Answer:
income summary 143,100 debit
salaries expense 143,100 credit
Explanation:
The company will do an adjusting entry to reocrd the expense for the accrued but not payed salaries of the year:
salaries expense 3,100 debit
salaries payables 3,100 credit
Thus, the total slaries expense for the year would be:
140,000 + 3,100 = 143,100
To close we will leave the expenses balance at zero thus, we will credit this amount against an auxiliary account called income summary.
Answer:

since 

Explanation:
U(q₁ q₂)

Budget law can be given by

Lagrangian function can be given by

First order condition csn be given by



From eqn (i) and eqn (ii) we have

Putting
in euqtion (iii) we have

since 

Answer:
Direct labor rate variance= $3,630 favorable
Explanation:
Giving the following information:
Standard production= 2 hours per unit
Standard labor cost= 14 per hour.
During August, Hassock produced 12,000 units and used 24,200 hours of direct labor at a total cost of $335,100.
To calculate the direct labor rate variance, we need to use the following formula:
Direct labor rate variance= (Standard Rate - Actual Rate)*Actual Quantity
Actual rate= 335,100/24,200= $13.85
Direct labor rate variance= (14 - 13.85)*24,200= $3,630 favorable
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Explanation: The first, addressed in Part I, is the administrative cost of deregulation, which has grown substantially under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.Part II addresses the consequences of the FCC's use of a competitor-welfare standard when formulating its policies for local competition, rather than a consumer-welfare standard. I evaluate the reported features of the FCC's decision in its Triennial Review. Press releases and statements concerning that decision suggest that the FCC may have finally embraced a consumer-welfare approach to mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices. The haphazard administrative process surrounding the FCC's decision, however, increases the likelihood of reversal on appeal.Beginning in Part III, I address at greater length the WorldCom fraud and bankruptcy. I offer an early assessment of the harm to the telecommunications industry from WorldCom's fraud and bankruptcy. I explain how WorldCom's misconduct caused collateral damage to other telecommunications firms, government, workers, and the capital markets. WorldCom's false Internet traffic reports and accounting fraud encouraged overinvestment in long-distance capacity and Internet backbone capacity. Because Internet traffic data are proprietary and WorldCom dominated Internet backbone services, and because WorldCom was subject to regulatory oversight, it was reasonable for rival carriers to believe WorldCom's misrepresentation of Internet traffic growth. Event study analysis suggests that the harm to rival carriers and telecommunications equipment manufacturers from WorldCom's restatement of earnings was $7.8 billion. WorldCom's false or fraudulent statements also supplied state and federal governments with incorrect information essential to the formulation of telecommunication policy. State and federal governments, courts, and regulatory commissions would thus be justified in applying extreme skepticism to future representations made by WorldCom.Part IV explains how WorldCom's fraud and bankruptcy may have been intended to harm competition, and in the future may do so, by inducing exit (or forfeiture of market share) by the company's rivals. WorldCom repeatedly deceived investors, competitors, and regulators with false statements about its Internet traffic projections and financial performance. At a minimum, WorldCom's fraudulent or false