Answer:
Gore is not required to make any accounting adjustments
Explanation:
Gore won't be required to make any accounting adjustments because the litigation loss is already $2,000,000 leading to him recording a liability in his account in which
$5 million in legitimate warranty claims were as well filed by his customers which is why he won't be making any further Accounting adjustment in 2021.
Answer:
Ignacio would have to fire some of his full time workers and hire contingent workers.
Contingent workers are independent contractors. So Ignacio wouldn't be responsible for paying employment taxes since contingent workers are responsible for handling their own taxes.
Answer:
The best batch size for this item is 400 units.
Explanation:
As given Annual demand (D)=1000 units, Carrying cost (H)=$10 per unit, set up cost (S)=$400.
As per the production order model formula will be:
\sqrt{2}D*S/H[1-d/p]} .
d for week=1000/50
=20. p per day
=40 units/7 days.
=5.71
d per day = 20/7
=2.85
Therefore on applying all these:\sqrt{}2*1000*400/10[1-2.85/5.7.
on solving this we will get 400 Units
Therefore, The best batch size for this item is 400 units.
Answer:
Rent Versus Buy. Alex Guadet of Nashville, Tennessee
b. Computation of Interest payable by Alex during the first year of the loan:
Interest = Net Mortgage amount x rate of interest
= ($148,300 x 5%)
= $7,415
Explanation:
a) Data and Calculation:
Mortgage amount = $150,000
Principal Reduction 1,700
Net Mortgage $148,300
b) Mortgage Interest is calculated as the Mortgage amount minus any reduction in the principal amount, multiplied by the interest rate. The interest represents the cost of capital that Alex pays for taking a mortgage on the property. For the bank, the interest represents the benefit for lending the mortgage loan to Alex.
Answer: Ethical Obligations and Decision-Making in Accounting-The Heading is devoted to helping students cultivate the ethical commitment needed to ensure that their work meets the highest standards of integrity, independence, and objectivity.
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Explanation: The first, addressed in Part I, is the administrative cost of deregulation, which has grown substantially under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.Part II addresses the consequences of the FCC's use of a competitor-welfare standard when formulating its policies for local competition, rather than a consumer-welfare standard. I evaluate the reported features of the FCC's decision in its Triennial Review. Press releases and statements concerning that decision suggest that the FCC may have finally embraced a consumer-welfare approach to mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices. The haphazard administrative process surrounding the FCC's decision, however, increases the likelihood of reversal on appeal.Beginning in Part III, I address at greater length the WorldCom fraud and bankruptcy. I offer an early assessment of the harm to the telecommunications industry from WorldCom's fraud and bankruptcy. I explain how WorldCom's misconduct caused collateral damage to other telecommunications firms, government, workers, and the capital markets. WorldCom's false Internet traffic reports and accounting fraud encouraged overinvestment in long-distance capacity and Internet backbone capacity. Because Internet traffic data are proprietary and WorldCom dominated Internet backbone services, and because WorldCom was subject to regulatory oversight, it was reasonable for rival carriers to believe WorldCom's misrepresentation of Internet traffic growth. Event study analysis suggests that the harm to rival carriers and telecommunications equipment manufacturers from WorldCom's restatement of earnings was $7.8 billion. WorldCom's false or fraudulent statements also supplied state and federal governments with incorrect information essential to the formulation of telecommunication policy. State and federal governments, courts, and regulatory commissions would thus be justified in applying extreme skepticism to future representations made by WorldCom.Part IV explains how WorldCom's fraud and bankruptcy may have been intended to harm competition, and in the future may do so, by inducing exit (or forfeiture of market share) by the company's rivals. WorldCom repeatedly deceived investors, competitors, and regulators with false statements about its Internet traffic projections and financial performance. At a minimum, WorldCom's fraudulent or false
