Using approximations to 1 significant figure check that your answer to part a makes sense

Mathematics

1 answer:

natka813 [3]2 years ago

3 0

Answer:

A significant figure is the first digit in a number that isn't zero. You round to this.

Step-by-step explanation:

E.g. 1959302 to 1 Sig Fig = 2000000

You round to the first figure that isn't zero, which is one

E.g 0.000001373 to 1 Sig Fig = 0.000001 because that 1 is the first digit that isn't zero

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anzhelika [568]

Answer:

a) 42°F < x < 176°F

b) The inequality graph is attached.

c) No, This is because at 20° F benzene would not be in liquid form but in solid form.

Step-by-step explanation:

According to the Question,

a) For the benzene to remain in liquid form, the temperature of benzene must be less than the boiling point and greater than the boiling point. Let x be the temperature of benzene, For benzene to remain as liquid, its temperature must be between:

42°F < x < 176°F

b) The inequality graph is attached. The graph shows that the temperature of benzene must be between 42°F and 176°F so that it would be a liquid. The Closed circles represent that it is greater than 2.

c) No, This is because at 20° F benzene would not be in liquid form but in solid form. Because the temperature cannot go below 42 before it freezes, she would not have been able to conduct her research .

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The planet mercury takes 56.6 earth days to rotate once about its axis.about how many times does it rotate about its axis during

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Around six and a half times.

6.4487 times in 365 days

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2 years ago

In the envelope game, there are two players and two envelopes. One of the envelopes is marked ''player 1 " and the other is mark

svetoff [14.1K]

Answer:

Step-by-step explanation:

a) The game tree for k = 5 has been drawn in the uploaded picture below where C stands for continuing and S stands for stopping:

b) Say we were to use backward induction we can clearly observe that stopping is optimal decision for each player in every round. Starting from last round, if player 1 stops he gets $3 otherwise zero if continues. Hence strategy S is optimal there.

Given this, player 2’s payoff to C is $3, while stopping yields $4, so second player will also chooses to stop. To which, player 1’s payoff in k = 3 from C is $1 and her payoff from S is $2, so she stops.

Given that, player 2 would stop in k = 2, which means that player 1 would stop also in k = 1.

The sub game perfect equilibrium is therefore the profile of strategies where both players always stop: (S, S, S) for player 1, and (S, S) for player 2.

c) Irrespective of whether both players would be better off if they could play the game for several rounds, neither can credibly commit to not stopping when given a chance, and so they both end up with small payoffs.

i hope this helps, cheers