Which identity could be the missing step to verify the identity (cos theta)(csc theta)=cot theta

1 answer:

N76 [4]2 years ago

5 0

(cosx)(cscx) = cotx
cscx = 1/sinx
(cosx)(1/sinx) = (cosx/sinx)
cosx/sinx = cotx

Basically, I noticed that cscx is equivalent to 1 divided by sinx, and then multiplied that fraction by cosx, which got me cosx/sinx. Your quotient identities will tell you that cosx/sinx = cotx

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i hope this helps, cheers