Consider the quadratic function.

1 answer:

4 0

A standard form for the quadratic function is
f(x) = ax² + bx + c
where the coefficients are a,b, and c.

The given quadratic function is
f(p) = p² - 8p - 5
When this function is compared to the standard form, with p replacing x, we obtain
a = 1 because the leading term is 1*p²,
b = -8 because the linear term is -8*p,
c = -5 because the constant term is -5.

Answer:
Of the answers given the correct one is the 3rd one:
a = 1, b = -8, c = -5.

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Step-by-step explanation:

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i hope this helps, cheers